The recruitment of armies from the peripheral regions, mainly from the steppelands of inner Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, became the most distinctive feature of the Islamic systems of governance until modern times. Known as mamluks — “owned ones” — these warriors were purchased as slaves from the highlands and steppes or captured from defeated tribes. Brought in as the sultan’s private armies and palace bodyguards, they were taught the rudiments of the Islamic faith and culture and trained in the military arts. Attaching the word “slave” to mamluks (as in “slave-warriors” or “slave-dynasties”) is somewhat misleading. Though mamluks and ghulams (household slaves) were bought and sold as personal property, their social position reflected that of their masters, rather than their own servile status. Eventually manumitted they became freedmen, clients of their former masters entitled to property rights, marriage, and personal security, with some of them rising to become rulers.
The practice of mamlukism started with the Abbasid caliphs, who recruited tribes from Transoxiana, Armenia, and North Africa to offset the power of the Tahirids. They balanced these tribes with Turkish ghulams who were purchased individually before being trained and drafted into regiments under individual commanders. Since they were housed in separate cantonments, with their own mosques and markets, their allegiance was to their commanders, rather than to the caliphs. In the breakup of the empire after 945 the practice was adopted by the defacto rulers who inherited the political power of the Abbasids. All the post-Abbasid states in the East — the Buyids, Ghaznavids, Qaraqanids, and Saljuqs — were created by ethnic minorities, including mercenaries from the Caspian region, and Turkish and other nomadic peoples from inner Asia. Since new military rulers had no ethnic, cultural, linguistic,
or historical connection with the peoples
over whom they ruled, society tended to
develop outside the purview of the state, with
the ulama — the religious scholars and experts
on law — merging with merchant and
landowning families to form elites of notables whose prestige was dependent on religious
knowledge. While allowing a form of
civil society to develop separately from the
military state, the practice of mamlukism
militated against the type of communal loyalties
or patriotisms that would emerge in
Western Europe at a later period. The pattern of recruiting erstwhile nomadic predators to
defend society against other nomads — of
making “wolves into sheepdogs” — is found
throughout the Muslim heartlands, from the
Maghreb to the Indus Valley.
The system of military slavery reached its
fullest development in Egypt, a densely populated
country of peasant cultivators without
an indigenous military class. The system was
institutionalized so successfully that mamluk
rule lasted for more than two and a half centuries (1250-1517), and resurfaced in a modifed
form under the Ottomans (1517-1811). By constantly replenishing their ranks from
abroad (firstly from among the Kipchak
Turks from Central Asia, later from among
the Circassians in the Caucasus) the Egyptian
mamluks resisted becoming absorbed into the
ranks of the indigenous elites. For the most
part they remained a one-generation aristocracy,
without ties of blood to the rest of
Egyptian society.
Under the Ottomans military slavery
evolved in a somewhat different direction.
From the late fourteenth century the sultans
began to offset the power of their sipahi cavalry
units levied from the estates of the nobility
or recruited as mercenaries from Arabic,
Kurdish, and Farsi-speaking nomads, an
infantry corps of “new troops”, Janissaries,
levied mainly from its Christian provinces in
the Balkans. The levy (known as the
devshirme) was conducted in the villages
about every four years: the towns were usually
exempt, as the sons of townsfolk were considered
too well educated or insufficiently
hardy. Boys between 13 and 18 were selected (although there are reports of children as
young as 8 being chosen). Since married men
were exempt, the Orthodox peasants often
married off their children very young to avoid
the levy. The selected boys (estimates are put
at around 20 percent) were given Muslim
identities and trained in the arts of war, with
the brightest selected for personal service to
the sultan, where they often rose to be rulers
of the empire. Although slave recruitment
ceased in the 1640s the Janissaries continued
to prosper, with increasing numbers of Muslim-born boys joining their ranks. Having
substantial commercial interests, salaries, and
state-funded pensions they became a privileged
and tyrannical elite, resistant to change. In 1826 Sultan Mahmud II used his newly
formed military force to slaughter most of
them at a muster in Istanbul.
The earliest form of the Ottoman military was a steppe-nomadic cavalry force. This was centralized by Osman I from Turkoman tribesmen inhabiting western Anatolia in the late 13th century.
These horsemen became an irregular force of raiders used as shock troops, armed with weapons like bows and spears. They were given fiefs called timars in the conquered lands, and were later called timariots. In addition they acquired wealth during campaigns.
Orhan I organized a standing army paid by salary rather than looting or fiefs. The infantry were called yayas and the cavalry was known as müsellems. The force was made up by foreign mercenaries for the most part, and only a few Turks were content to accept salaries in place of timars. Foreign mercenaries were not required to convert to Islamas long as they obeyed their Ottoman commanders.
The Ottomans began using guns in the late 14th century. Following that, other troop types began to appear, such as the regular musketeers (Piyade Topçu, literally "foot artillery"); regular cavalry armed with firearms (Süvari Topçu Neferi, literally "mounted artillery soldier"), similar to the later European reiter or carabinier; and bombardiers (Humbaracı), consisting of grenadiers who threw explosives called khımbara and the soldiers who served the artillery with maintenance and powder supplies.
The Ottoman Empire was the first of the three Islamic Gunpowder Empires, followed by Safavid Persia and Mughal India. By the 14th century, the Ottomans had adopted gunpowder artillery. The adoption of the gunpowder weapons by the Ottomans was so rapid that they “preceded both their European and Middle Eastern adversaries in establishing centralized and permanent troops specialized in the manufacturing and handling of firearms.” But it was their use of artillery shocked their adversaries and impelled the other two Islamic Gunpowder Empires to accelerate their weapons program. The Ottomans had artillery at least by the reign of Bayezid I and used them in the sieges of Constantinople in 1399 and 1402. They finally proved their worth as siege engines in the successful siege of Salonica in 1430.
The Ottoman military’s regularized use of firearms proceeded ahead of the pace of their European counterparts. The Janissaries had initially been an infantry bodyguard using bows and arrows. By the time of Sultan Mehmed II, they had been drilled with firearms and became “perhaps the first standing infantry force equipped with firearms in the world.” The Janissaries are thus considered the first modern standing armies. The combination of artillery and Janissary firepower proved decisive at Varna in 1444 against a force of Crusaders, and later Başkent in 1473 against the Aq Qoyunlu.
The arquebus first appeared in the Ottoman Empire at some point between 1394 and the early 15th century.The arquebus was later used in substantial numbers by the Janissaries of the Ottoman army by the mid-15th century. The matchlock first began to be used by the Janissary corps in the first half of the 15th century, by the 1440s.
Ottoman Janissaries — often heralded as the precursor to Eurasia’s first modern standing army.
Ottoman Classical Army was the military structure established by Mehmed II, during his reorganization of the state and the military efforts. This is the major reorganization following Orhan I which organized a standing army paid by salary rather than booty or fiefs. This army was the force during rise of the Ottoman Empire. The organization was twofold, central (Kapu Kulu) and peripheral(Eyalet).The classical Ottoman army was the most disciplined and feared military force of its time, mainly due to its high level of organization, logistical capabilities and its elite troops. Following a century long reform efforts, this Army was forced to disbandment by Sultan Mahmud II on 15 June 1826 by what is known as Auspicious Incident. By the reign of Mahmud the second, the elite jannisaries had become corrupt and always stood in the way of modernization efforts meaning they were more of a liability then an asset.
By the siege of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans had large enough cannons to batter the walls of the city, to the surprise of the defenders. The Dardanelles Gun was designed and cast in bronze in 1464 by Munir Ali. The Dardanelles Gun was still present for duty more than 340 years later in 1807, when a Royal Navy force appeared and commenced the Dardanelles Operation. Turkish forces loaded the ancient relics with propellant and projectiles, then fired them at the British ships. The British squadron suffered 28 casualties from this bombardment.
The musket first appeared in the Ottoman Empire by 1465. Damascus steel was later used in the production of firearms such as the musket from the 16th century. At the Battle of Mohács in 1526, the Janissaries equipped with 2000 muskets "formed nine consecutive rows and they fired their weapons row by row," in a "kneeling or standing position without the need for additional support or rest." The Chinese later adopted the Ottoman kneeling position for firing. In 1598, Chinese writer Zhao Shizhen described Turkish muskets as being superior to European muskets.
Armor, shield, toug, saddle and Ottoman saber captured by the Austrians at the Battle of Vienna.
Acemi Oglan Janissary trainee early 16th century, with Ic Oglan Cavusu officer of Janissary recruits (17th century) to right and Falakaci Basi of punishment unit (17th-18th century) to the left. Artist: Christa Hook (The Janissaries, Osprey Elite Series).
Reform on Classical Army (1606-1826)
Officers in the Ottoman army, 19th Century, 1895. Colonel of Infantry, Commander of cavalry and Lietenant colonel of Artillery.
The main theme of this period is reforming the Janissaries. The Janissary corps were originally made up of conscripted young Christian boys who became military educated under the Ottoman Empire. During the 15th and 16th Centuries they became known as the most efficient and effective military unit in Europe. Aside from the Janissary infantry, there was also the Sipahi Cavalry. They were, however, different from the Janissaries in that they had both military and administrative duties. The Janissaries were tied strictly to being able to perform military duties at any time, however the Sipahi were treated differently primarily in that they got their income from the land that was given to them from the Sultan. Within these agricultural lands, the Sipahi were in charge of collecting the taxes which would serve as their salary. At the same time they were responsible for maintaining peace and order there. They were also expected to be able to serve in the military whenever the Sultan deemed their service necessary.
In 1621, the Chinese Wu Pei Chih described Turkish muskets that used a rack-and-pinion mechanism, which was not known to have been used in any European or Chinese firearms at the time.
The Ottoman Empire made numerous efforts to recruit French experts for its modernization. The French officer and adventurer Claude-Alexandre de Bonneval(1675-1747) went in the service of Sultan Mahmud I, converted to Islam, and endeavoured to modernize the Ottoman army, creating cannon foundries, powder and musket factories and a military engineering school. Another officer François Baron de Tottwas involved in the reform efforts for the Ottoman military. He succeeded in having a new foundry built to make howitzers, and was instrumental in the creation of mobile artillery units. He built fortifications on the Bosphorus and started a naval science course that laid the foundation stone for the later Turkish Naval Academy.
One example of an advisor who achieved limited success was François Baron de Tott, a French officer. He did succeed in having a new foundry built to make artillery. As well he directed the construction of a new naval base. Unfortunately it was almost impossible for him to divert soldiers from the regular army into the new units. The new ships and guns that made it into service were too few to have much of an influence on the Ottoman army and de Tott returned home.
When they had requested French help, a young artillery officer by the name of Napoleon Bonaparte was to be sent to Constantinople in 1795 to help organize Ottoman artillery. He did not go, for just days before he was to embark for the Near East he proved himself useful to the Directory by putting down a Parisian mob at 13 Vendémiaire and was kept in France.
The failed efforts of a new system dates before 1826. Sultan Selim III formed the Nizam-ı Cedid army (Nizam-ı Cedid meaning New Order) in the late 18th century and early 19th century. This was the first serious attempt to transform the Ottoman military forces into a modern army. However, the Nizam-ı Cedid was short lived, dissolving after the abdication of Selim III in 1807.
Sultan Mahmud II, Selim III's successor and nephew, who was a great reformer, disbanded the Janissaries in 1826 with so-called known as "Vaka-ı Hayriye" (the auspicious incident).
Egypt, as part of the empire, also underwent drastic military changes during Muhammad Ali Pasha’s reign. The two largest military reforms were the effective practices of indoctrination and surveillance, which dramatically changed the way the military was both conducted by the leadership and also perceived by the rest of society. New military law codes resulted in isolation, extreme surveillance, and severe punishments to enforce obedience. The Pasha's goal was to create a high regard for the law and strict obedience stemming from sincere want. This shift from direct control by bodily punishment to indirect control through strict law enforcement aimed to make the soldiers' lives predictable, thus creating a more manageable military for the Pasha.
Modern Army (1861-1918)
A Nizam-i-Cedid line infantryman. In the 1790s the Ottoman army was fundamentally reformed to include more professional musketmen. The reforms produced regiments known as the Nizam-i-Cedid, or “new order.”
The main theme of this period is organizing and training the newly formed units. The change of French system to German system as the German military mission was most effective during the period. The military units formed were used in the Balkan Wars and World War I.
The shift from Classical Army (1451-1606) took more than a century beginning from failed attempts of Selim III (1789) to a period of Ottoman military reforms (1826-1858) and finally Abdulhamid II. Abdulhamid II, as early as 1880 sought, and two years later secured, German assistance, which culminated in the appointment of Lt. Col. Kohler. However. Although the consensus that Abdulhamid favored the modernization of the Ottoman army and the professionalization of the officer corps was fairly general, it seems that he neglected the military during the last fifteen years of his reign, and he also cut down the military budget. The formation of Ottoman Modern Army was a slow process with ups and downs.
The Ottoman Navy, also known as the Ottoman Fleet, was established in the early 14th century after the empire first expanded to reach the sea in 1323 by capturing Karamürsel, the site of the first Ottoman naval shipyard and the nucleus of the future Navy. During its long existence, it was involved in many conflicts and signed a number of maritime treaties. At its height, the Navy extended to the Indian Ocean, sending an expedition to Indonesia in 1565.
For much of its history, the Navy was led by the position of the Kapudan Pasha (Grand Admiral; literally "Captain Pasha"). This position was abolished in 1867, when it was replaced by the Minister of the Navy (Turkish: Bahriye Nazırı) and a number of Fleet Commanders (Turkish: Donanma Komutanları).
The Ottoman Aviation Squadrons were military aviation units of the Ottoman Army and Navy. The history of Ottoman military aviation dates back to June 1909 or July 1911 depending if active duty assignment is accepted as the establishment. The organisation is sometimes referred to as the Ottoman Air Force.According to Edward J. Erickson, the very term Ottoman Air Force is a gross exaggeration and the term Osmanlı Hava Kuvvetleri (Ottoman Air Force) unfortunately is often repeated in contemporary Turkish sources. The fleet size reached its greatest in December 1916, when the Ottoman aviation squadrons had 90 airplanes. The Aviation Squadrons were reorganized as the "General Inspectorate of Air Forces" (Kuva-yı Havaiye Müfettiş-i Umumiliği) on 29 July 1918. With the signing of the Armistice of Mudroson 30 October 1918, the Ottoman military aviation effectively came to an end. At the time of the armistice, the Ottoman military aviation had around 100 pilots; 17 land-based airplanecompanies (4 planes each); and 3 seaplanecompanies (4 planes each); totalling 80 aircraft.
In 1389 the Ottomans introduced a system of military conscription. In times of need every town, quarter, and village had the duty to present a fully equipped conscript at the recruiting office. The new force of irregular infantrymen, called Azabs, was used in a number of different ways. They supported the supplies to the front-line, they dug roads and built bridges. On rare occasions they were used as cannon fodder to slow down an enemy advance. A branch of the Azabs were the bashi-bazouk (başıbozuk). These specialized in close combat and were sometimes mounted. Recruited from the homeless, vagrants and criminals, they became notorious for their undisciplined brutality.
Training
Ottoman Military College
The Ottoman Military College in Istanbul was the Ottoman Empire's two-year military staff college, which aimed to educate staff officers for the Ottoman Army.
Ottoman Military Academy
Marshal Ahmed Fevzi Pasha together with Mehmed Namık Pasha formed the Academy in 1834 as the Mekteb-i Harbiye (Ottoman Turkish: lit. "War School"), and the first class of officers graduated in 1841. This foundation occurred in the context of military reforms within the Ottoman Empire, which recognized the need for more educated officers to modernize its army. The need for a new military order was part of the reforms of Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839), continued by his son Abdülmecit I (r. 1839–1861).
The origin of the Naval Academy goes back to 1773, when Sultan Mustafa III's Grand Vizier and Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha founded a naval school under the name of "Naval Engineering at Golden Horn Naval Shipyard". François Baron de Tott, a French officer and advisor to the Ottoman military, was appointed for the establishment of a course to provide education on plane geometry and navigation. The course, attended also by civilian captains of the merchant marine, took place on board a galleon anchored at Kasimpaşa in Istanbul and lasted three months. The temporary course turned into a continuous education on land with the establishment of "Naval Mathematical College" in February 1776. With growing numbers of cadets, the college building at the naval shipyard was extended. On 22 October 1784 the college, renamed the "Imperial Naval Engineering School" (Ottoman Turkish: Mühendishâne-i Bahrî-i Hümâyûn), started its three-year education courses in the new building. From 1795 on, the training was divided into navigation and cartography for officers of the deck, and naval architecture and shipbuilding for naval engineers. In 1838 the naval school moved into its new building in Kasımpaşa. With the beginning (1839) of the reformation efforts, the school was renamed "Naval School" (Ottoman Turkish: Mekteb-i Bahriye) and continued to operate in Kasımpaşa for 12 years. Then it was relocated in 1850 to Heybeliada for the last time. During the Second Constitutional Era, an upgraded education system was adapted in 1909 from the Royal Naval Academy.
Aghas commanded the different branches of the military services, for example: "azap agha", "besli agha", "janissary agha", for the commanders of azaps, beslis, and janissaries, respectively. This designation was given to commanders of smaller military units, too, for instance the "bölük agha", and the "ocak agha", the commanders of a "bölük" (company) and an "ocak" (troop) respectively.
Boluk-bashi was a commander of a "bölük", equivalent to the rank of captain.
Çorbacı (Turkish for "soup server") was a commander of an orta (regiment), approximately corresponding to the rank of colonel (Turkish: Albay) today. In seafaring, the term was in use for the boss of a ship's crew, a role similar to that of boatswain.
Modern army
The system of ranks and insignia followed the patterns of the German Empire.
[1] (Yaya & Musellem) Yaya, light infantry, Musellem, light cavalry, over time they lost their original martial qualities and were employed only at such tasks as transportation or founding cannonballs. The organisation was totally abolished in 1582.
[2] (Azab) light infantry, during the last quarter of the 16th century, the Azabs disappeared from the Ottoman documentary record.
[3] (Akıncı) light cavalry, the Akıncıs continued to serve until 1595 when after a major rout in Wallachia they were dissolved by Grand Vezir Koca Sinan Paşa.
The first Ottoman army had been composed entirely of Turkmen nomads, who had remained largely under the command of the religious orders that had converted most of them to Islam. Armed with bows and arrows and spears, those nomadic cavalrymen had lived mostly on booty, although those assigned as ghazis to border areas or sent to conquer and raid Christian lands also had been given more permanent revenues in the form of taxes levied on the lands they garrisoned. Those revenue holdings were formalized as mukâṭaʿas, held by tribal leaders and ghazi commanders who used their revenues to feed, supply, and arm their followers. It was that type of mukâṭaʿa that developed into the Ottoman form of fief, the timar, which was the basis of Ottoman military and administrative organization as the European portions of the empire were conquered from the vassals in the 15th century and placed under direct Ottoman administration. Those nomadic troops had predominated through Orhan’s reign, until he saw that such undisciplined cavalrymen were of limited use in besieging and taking large cities. In addition, once he had established his state, he had found it difficult to maintain order with such an army because the nomads still preferred to maintain themselves by looting, in the lands of their commander as well as in those of the enemy.
To replace the nomads, Orhan organized a separate standing army of hired mercenaries paid by salary rather than booty or by timar estates. Those mercenaries organized as infantry were called yayas; those organized as cavalry, müsellems. Although the new force included some Turkmens who were content to accept salaries in place of booty, most of its men were Christian soldiers from the Balkans who were not required to convert to Islam as long as they obeyed their Ottoman commanders.As Murad I conquered more and more of southeastern Europe, those forces became mainly Christian, and, as they came to dominate the Ottoman army, the older Turkmen cavalry forces were maintained along the frontiers as irregular shock troops, called akıncis, who were compensated only by booty. As the yayas and müsellems expanded in numbers, their salaries became too burdensome for the Ottoman treasury, so in most cases the newly conquered lands were assigned to their commanders in the form of timars. That new regular army developed the techniques of battle and siege that were used to achieve most of the 14th-century Ottoman conquests, but, because it was commanded by members of the Turkish notable class, it became the major vehicle for their rise to predominance over the sultans, whose direct military supporters were limited to the vassal contingents.
Only late in the 14th century did Murad I and Bayezid Iattempt to build up their own personal power by building a military slave force for the sultan under the name kapıkulu. Murad based the new force on his right to a fifth of the war booty, which he interpreted to include captives taken in battle. As those men entered his service, they were converted to Islam and trained as Ottomans, gaining the knowledge and experience required for service in the government as well as the army, while remaining in the sultan’s personal service. During the late 14th century that force — particularly its infantry branch, the Janissary corps — became the most important element of the Ottoman army. The provincial forces maintained and provided by the timar holders constituted the Ottoman cavalry and were called sipahis, while the irregular akıncis and salaried yayas and müsellems were relegated to rear-line duties and lost their military and political importance. But, when Bayezid I abandoned the ghazi tradition and moved into Anatolia, he lost the support of the Turkish notables and their sipahis before his new kapıkulu army was fully established. He therefore had to rely only on the Christian vassal forces at the Battle of Ankara (1402), and, although they demonstrated considerable valour and fighting ability, they were overwhelmed by Timur’s powerful army.
When the Ottoman Empire was restored under Sultan Mehmed I, the Turkish notables, in order to deprive the sultan of the only military force he could use to resist their control, required him to abandon the kapıkulu, justifying the action on the basis of the Islamic tradition that Muslims could not be kept in slavery. The European and Anatolian revolts that arose early in the reign of Murad II were at least partly stimulated and supported by members of the kapıkulu, as well as the Christian slaves and vassals who had been losing their power to the Turkish notables. As soon as Murad II came to power, however, he resumed earlier efforts to make the sultanate more independent, building up the strength of the Janissaries and their associates and playing them off against the notables. He distributed most of his conquests to members of the kapıkulu force, occasionally as timars but more often as tax farms ( iltizāms), so that the treasury could obtain the money it needed to maintain the Janissary army entirely on a salaried basis. In addition, in order to man the new force, Murad developed the devşirme system of recruiting the best Christian youths from southeastern Europe.
Whereas Mehmed II used the conquest of Constantinople to destroy the major Turkish notable families and build up the power of the devşirme, Murad sought only to establish a balance of power and function between the two groups so that he could use and control both for the benefit of the empire. Thus he enlarged the concept of kapıkulu to include members of the Turkish nobility and their Turkmen sipahis as well as the products of the devşirme. Now only persons accepting the status of slaves of the sultan could hold positions in the Ottoman government and army. Persons of Muslim and non-Muslim origin could achieve that status as long as they accepted the limitations involved: absolute obedience to their master and the devotion of their lives, properties, and families to his service. From then on, all important ministers, military officers, judges, governors, timar holders, tax farmers, Janissaries, sipahis, and the like were made members of that class and attached to the will and service of the sultan. The salaried Janissary corps remained the primary source of strength of the devşirme class, whereas the sipahis and the timar system remained the bases of power of the Turkish notables. Mehmed II thus avoided the fate of the great Middle Eastern empires that had preceded that of the Ottomans, in which rule had been shared among members of the ruling dynasty and with others and rapid disintegration had resulted. The Ottomans established the principle of indivisibility of rule,with all members of the ruling class subjected to the absolute will of the sultan.
NARRATOR: The Ottomans have a convincing means to back up their bold political aspirations for empire - an extremely well-organized army with elite units. The Janissary corps, for example, were special forces that weaned new soldiers. Using the devshirme, the blood tax, they conscripted soldiers from Christian families in the Balkans. Organized kidnappings, as blood tax, forced thousands of small boys from what is now the area of Serbia and Romania into the Ottoman army. The cavalry archers were the most potent armed unit the Ottomans had to offer. They used bows and arrows long after the advent of firearms.
The Ottoman bow. A precise replica will be used in an attempt to demonstrate just how much power this antique weapon really possessed. Peter Lange heads the experiment. The archery instructor is an expert bowman, yet even he can't manage to draw back the Ottoman bow. Before testing the force of impact the crash test dummies, the kind used in car safety tests, are fitted with breastplates which are equal in strength to those used by enemy soldiers during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. The experiment begins. The arrowhead pierces deep into the dummy's armor.
PETER LANGE [translation]: "The measurements show an average velocity of 240 kilometers an hour, that was a very high speed given the era. The Ottomans achieved this by developing a short composite bow that made it possible to get such great acceleration."
NARRATOR: The Ottoman army - a collection of elite forces. A unit which, despite consisting of kidnapped children, was renowned for its loyalty. Rigorous training and the promise of careers transformed kidnapped children into committed soldiers. For centuries the Ottoman army was considered one of the world's most potent and modern military machines.
NARRATOR: From the 15th century on, sultans continue their rampant conquests, expanding their territory from Constantinople westwards. There were many stops along the triumphant pathway leading to a prestigious prize: Vienna. On the 15th of July 1683, 300,000 Ottoman soldiers stood before the gates of the city on the Danube. Confident of the superiority of his forces, the Ottoman general Kara Mustafa bides time. Vienna has to fall sooner or later. A constant barrage of artillery fire and a massive deployment of explosives cause the city's fortifications to crumble. Vienna has only 10,000 soldiers to defend it. Nonetheless, they succeed in fending off the Ottomans, holding large sections of the city walls. The reason: The Ottomans attack in small groups. Sure that Vienna would surrender, Sultan Mustafa Kara pursues this strategy to spare his army.
DR. KLAUS REINHARDT: [translation]: "Mustafa Kara's colossal mistake was that he didn't act quickly. Instead, he braced himself for a long siege. This allowed his adversary to wait for reinforcements, which is ultimately why he lost the battle."
NARRATOR: Unbeknownst to him, the sultan gives a German-Polish army the time to join forces with the Viennese. The attack catches the Ottomans by surprise, most flee. What was expected to be a resounding triumph would go down in history as the Turks' most crushing defeat. Once again Vienna and Europe escape by the skin of their teeth.
